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In a sticky-price model with labor market search and habit persistence, Walsh (2005) shows 
that inertia in the interest rate policy helps to reconcile the inflation and output persistence 
with empirical observations for the US economy. We show that this finding is sensitive with 
regard to the introduction of capital formation. While we are able to replicate the findings for 
the inflation inertia in a model with capital adjustment costs and variable capacity utilization, 
the output response to an interest shock is found to be too large and no longer hump-shaped in 
this case. In addition we find that the response of output to a technology shock can only be 
reconciled with empirical findings if either the adjustment of the utilization rate is very costly 
or there is only a modest amount of nominal rigidity in the economy. 
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There is ample evidence from structural vector autoregressions using di®erent identi¯cation
schemes and data sets that a sudden increase of the short term nominal interest rate
produces a persistent and hump-shaped response of output and in°ation.1 In recent studies,
labor market imperfections have been introduced into monetary business cycle models in
order to replicate these ¯ndings. Christiano et al. (2005) model nominal rigidities in the
form of both price and wage staggering in order to explain the observed inertia in in°ation
after a monetary expansion. Walsh (2005) and Trigari (2004) consider search and matching
frictions in the labor market. Walsh (2005) ¯nds that the inertia of the interest rate policy
itself is an important contributing factor for the explanation of the in°ation and output
inertia, while Trigari (2004) considers the e®ects of the wage bargaining process on the
variation of both in°ation and real wages following a monetary shock.2
In this paper, we consider the sensitivity of the latter studies with respect to the introduc-
tion of capital. Our economy is based upon the model of Walsh (2005). In addition, we
introduce capital as a second production factor besides labor. The reasoning why capital
may introduce a di®erent dynamic response of in°ation and output to a monetary shock is
as follows: In the model of Walsh (2005) the marginal costs of price setters equal the rela-
tive price of intermediate goods in terms of the ¯nal good. Intermediate good ¯rms adjust
their nominal price immediately while wholesale ¯rms respond only sluggishly to a demand
or supply shock. Thus, marginal costs of price setters decrease in response to a negative
demand shock. The size of this shock depends on the response of the household sector to
an increase of the nominal interest rate. Without capital and with habit persistence in
consumption this e®ect is small. However, if capital allows for intertemporal substitution,
overall demand can decrease signi¯cantly. Obviously, the adjustment of capital as a second
factor of production also a®ects the dynamics of output.
As one of our main results, our model with capital is able to generate in°ation dynamics
following an interest rate shock that is in accordance with empirical observations. There-
fore, we are able to con¯rm this ¯nding of Walsh (2005) who considers a model without
1See, among others, Sims (1992), Leeper et al. (1996), and Christiano et al. (1999, 2005).
2Subsequently, the labor market search model has also been prominently applied to the analysis of
the Ramsey policy as, e.g., in Faia (2007), or the study of the business-cycle dynamics of wages as in
Rotemberg (2006).
1capital. Similar to Christiano et al. (2005), we also ¯nd that the introduction of variable
capital utilization is an important factor for the modelling of the inertia in the in°ation
dynamics. In this case, rather the capacity than the investment demand increases after
a fall in the interest rate so that the real interest rate displays a smaller variation. In
the model with capital, however, an unexpected rise in the nominal interest rate does not
trigger a hump-shaped response of output, quite contrary to the model without capital.
In addition, we also analyze the e®ects of a technology shock on the output-in°ation dy-
namics. Most studies including Walsh (2005), Christiano et al. (2005), or Trigari (2004)
neglect this question. We consider it an interesting problem because a researcher is ulti-
mately aiming for a monetary general equilibrium model that is able to match the empirical
responses to various kinds of supply, demand, and policy shocks simultaneously. As one
prominent example, consider the analysis of optimal monetary policy and to what extent
the monetary authority should respond to a productivity shock. Here, too, we ¯nd that
while the in°ation dynamics is insensitive to the assumption of ¯xed capital services the
output dynamics is not. In line with empirical evidence, we get a protracted hump-shaped
decline of the rate of in°ation in response to a productivity shock in our model with capital
accumulation and a variable utilization rate of capital. However, this model also implies a
signi¯cant immediate decrease of output that is not observed in estimated impulse response
functions. We can reconcile the model with empirical evidence if we either assume that it
is very costly to adjust the utilization rate of capital or that the degree of nominal rigidity
in our model economy is small.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. In
Section 3, we describe the calibration and computation of the model. Section 4 presents
our results, and Section 5 concludes. In the Appendix, we provide the log-linearized version
of the model.
2 The model economy
In this section, we describe our model that is based upon Walsh (2005). Three di®erent
sectors are depicted: ¯rms, households, and the monetary authority.
22.1 Firms
2.1.1 Retail sector
A ¯nal goods or retail sector buys di®erentiated goods Yjt distributed over the unit interval,










; µ > 1: (1)















where Pjt is the nominal price of good j 2 [0;1] and Pt is the price level. The zero pro¯t










Firms in the wholesale sector purchase intermediate goods yjt, j 2 [0;1] from the produc-














is the price of the output of the production sector in terms of the ¯nal good. From the
perspective of the wholesale sector gt are the real marginal costs faced by any ¯rm in this
sector.
3Prices are set according to the mechanism set out in Calvo (1983). In each period (1 ¡ !)
of the wholesale ¯rms are allowed to set their relative price Pjt=Pt optimally. Henceforth
we use the index A to refer to these ¯rms. Walsh (2005) follows Christiano et al. (2005)
and assumes that prices must be set before the monetary shock is realized. The remaining
fraction of the wholesale ¯rms, indexed by N, adjusts their price according to a rule of
thumb: They increase their price according to the in°ation factor (one plus the rate of
in°ation) of the previous period ¼t¡1:











Et¡1^ ¼t+1 + ¡Et¡1^ gt (7)
with ¡ =
(1¡!)(1¡¯!)
(1+¯)! and where a hat over a variable denotes its percentage deviation
from its steady-state value. ¯ denotes the discount factor of the household that will be
introduced below. We also consider the e®ect of a monetary policy shock if the price setting








Et^ ¼t+1 + ¡^ gt: (8)
2.1.3 Intermediate goods sector
Employment relationships consist of a worker and a ¯rm. At the beginning of each period
there are Nt employed workers and, thus, Nt worker-¯rm pairs indexed by i. For reasons
outside of the model, the fraction of ½x of those pairs separate. The remaining pairs
observe the current state of the environment and decide whether or not to continue their
relationship. Those that do not separate produce output. Figure 1 depicts the timing of
events in this model.
Output produced by a worker-¯rm pair i is given by
yit = Ztaitk
®
it; ® 2 (0;1): (9)
kit are capital services, Zt is a random productivity disturbance that is common to all ¯rms,
and ait is a random productivity disturbance that is speci¯c to relationship i 2 [0;1]. The
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it ¡ rtkit ¡ l;
where l denotes the disutility of work. Firm i pays real interest rt on its capital services







Job creation. The decision to severe the relationship depends on the outside options of
the worker and the ¯rm and on the present value of continuing the relationship into the
next period vit. Note that except for the realization of ait all employment relationships face
the same conditions. Thus, if ait is distributed identically and independently over time, vit
must be equal for all worker-¯rm pairs and we can drop the index i from this variable and
all others as well. In equilibrium, the present value of the ¯rm's outside opportunities is
zero, and the value of the worker's outside opportunities equals the present value of being
unemployed wu
t . The surplus of an employment relationship thus can be written as
st = gtZtatk(at)
® ¡ rtk(at) ¡ l + vt ¡ w
u
t : (11)
The ¯rm and the worker will terminate their relationship if ait < at, where at is determined
as solution to
gtZtatk(at)
® ¡ rtk(at) ¡ l + vt ¡ w
u
t = 0: (12)
Note that due to (10) and (12) the surplus of an employment relationship can also be
written as























f(a)da = F(at); (14)
where f(a) and F(a) denote the probability density function and the distribution function
of ait, respectively. Since new matches from period t will not produce before period t + 1
the mass of workers that are unemployed during period t equals
















Matching technology. Given the number of unemployed persons Ut and the number of
¯rms that o®er jobs Vt, employment evolves according to
Nt+1 = (1 ¡ ½
x)(1 ¡ ½
n
t )Nt + m(Ut;Vt); (16)






t ; Â 2 (0;1): (17)





















Job creation. We assume that the ¯rm obtains the share 1 ¡ ´ 2 (0;1) from an em-
ployment relationship that produces in period t. The probability that a worker-¯rm pair
that is matched in period t will produce in period t+1 is (1¡½x)(1¡½n
t+1). The expected








6where f(a)=(1 ¡ ½n
t+1) is the conditional density of the event aja ¸ at+1. We assume free















where ¯(¸t+1=¸t) is the stochastic discount factor and ¸t the marginal utility of consump-
tion that we will introduce in a moment. Equation (20) establishes that the outside value
of a ¯rm equals zero.
The present value of unemployment. In period t an unemployed worker faces the
probability ·w in (19) to ¯nd a job. The probability that he will not loose this job in the
next period is (1 ¡ ½x)(1 ¡ ½n
t+1). Since the worker always receives the value of his outside
option, the present value of being unemployed is determined by
w
u















where b is the worker's valuation of leisure time.
The present value of a continuing employment relationship. A worker-¯rm pair
that produces in the next period receives the expected value of its surplus. Since the worker
always receives the value of its outside option wu
t+1 and since the value of the ¯rm's outside
option equals zero, the present discounted value of a match that continues to produce in





























qt = vt ¡ w
u
t + b:









Employed and unemployed workers pool their income so that we can ignore distributional
issues. Employed workers supply one unit of labor inelastically with disutility l while
unemployed workers enjoy leisure at value b. As in Walsh (2005), we introduce habit
formation in the utility function. In addition, the household obtains utility from real
money Mt=Pt. The households current-period utility function is given by:
u(Ct;Ct¡1;³t;Mt=Pt) :=
(Ct ¡ hCt¡1)1¡¾ ¡ 1
1 ¡ ¾
+ (1 ¡ ³t)b ¡ ³tl + Á(Mt=Pt);






According to this speci¯cation the household's marginal utility of consumption also depends
upon his level of consumption in the previous period. In particular, the marginal utility of
consumption is higher if Ct is closer to Ct¡1.
Income received from employment relationships that are not severed at the beginning of
period t is given by














In addition, the household receives pro¯ts ­t from the wholesale sector and transfers Tt
from the monetary authority.
The household holds beginning-of-period nominal money Mt and bonds Bt, as well as real
physical capital stock ¹ Kt. Bonds are issued by other households and pay a nominal rate
of interest it. The nominal interest rate factor is denoted by Rt := 1 + it. Following
Christiano et al. (2005), capital services Kt are related to the physical stock of capital ¹ Kt
by Kt = ut ¹ Kt, where ut denotes the utilization rate of capital.3 The household's budget
constraint is given by :
Bt+1 + Mt+1
Pt






¡ °Vt ¡ Ct ¡ It ¡ ¶(ut) ¹ Kt; (26)
3For reason of modelling simplicity, the household rather than the ¯rm chooses ut.
8where It and ¶(ut) denotes investment and the costs of setting the utilization rate to ut,
respectively. In the non-stochastic steady state, ¹ u = 1 and ¶(¹ u) = 0.
The stock of capital evolves according to





¹ Kt + (1 ¡ ±) ¹ Kt: (27)
We assume that the concave function ©(¢) does not change the non-stochastic steady state
of the model. Thus, I = ±K implying ©(±) = ± and ©0(±) = 1. The absolute value of the












with regard to Mt+1, Bt+1, ¹ Kt+1, Ct, It, and ut subject to (26) and (27). The ¯rst-order
conditions of the household are given by:
¸t = (Ct ¡ hCt¡1)
¡¾ ¡ ¯hEt(Ct+1 ¡ hCt)
¡¾ (28a)
¶
























1 ¡ ± + ©(It+1=Kt+1)
´i
: (28f)
Equations (28a) and (28b) are the optimal conditions for the current-period consumption
level Ct and utilization rate ut, respectively. Condition (28c) ensures that bonds have
the same expected rate of return as capital. Note, that Bt ´ 0 in equilibrium, since we
are aggregating the holdings of bonds over the members of the representative household.
Equation (28d) induces a money demand function. Since the central bank will pursue an
interest rate policy, we can disregard this equation. In (28e), the variable »t is Tobin's q
and gives the number of units of output which must be forgone to increase the stock of
capital by one unit (this equals £t=¸t, where £t is the Lagrange multiplier of the constraint
(27) in the household's optimization problem).
92.3 Monetary authority
The central bank targets the nominal interest rate and supplies the amount of money
necessary to achieve its target rate. We use the following rule:







Át; Át » N(0;¾Á): (29)
It is well-known that the exponent of the in°ation factor Á¼ must be greater than one
to ensure a determinate equilibrium. In the non-stochastic stationary equilibrium of the
model the Euler equation (28c) implies ¼ = ¯R and the Taylor rule delivers ¼ = ¹ ¼.4
Given the monetary policy, the nominal quantity of money adjust so that the money market







Kt = ut ¹ Kt;
and the aggregate amount of capital services, Kt, is given by the sum of the individual
capital services
























Aggregating yit in (9) over all productive worker-¯rm pairs using this de¯nition of capital









4The policy rule of Walsh (2005) is only consistent with zero in°ation, ¹ ¼ = 1.
10Firms redistribute all pro¯ts to the households, and the monetary authority transfers the
seignorage. In equilibrium and using the de¯nition of income from (25), the resource
constraint of the economy is given by
Yt = Ct + It + °Vt + ¶(ut) ¹ Kt: (33)
3 Calibration and computation
If not mentioned otherwise, the choice of the functional forms and the parameterization
follows Walsh (2005).
3.1 Functional form assumptions
We assume that the ¯rm-speci¯c productivity shock a is log-normally distributed with













has a standard normal distribution, and we get z from the inverse of the cumulative
distribution function of the standard normal distribution at the steady state value of ½n.







According to our speci¯cation of the functions © and ¶ the dynamics of the model only
depends on the elasticities ¾© and ¾¶ of the functions ©0 and ¶0 with respect to their
arguments, respectively.
113.2 Parameterization
We analyze the sensitivity of our model with respect to the introduction of capital adjust-
ment costs and variable capital utilization. Therefore, our main interest is the sensitivity of
the model with regard to the choice of the parameters ¾© and ¾¶, respectively. In addition,
we study the model's behavior depending on the parameter values for the price rigidity !
and the habit parameter h. Periods correspond to quarters.
Preferences. Following Walsh (2005), we set the discount factor ¯ = 0:989, the in-
tertemporal elasticity of substitution 1=¾ = 0:5, and the habit parameter h = 0:78. The
parameter values are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1:
Parameter choice in the steady state of the benchmark model
Preferences ¯=0.989 ¾=2 h=0.78
Labor Market ½x=0.068 ½n=0.0343 ·f=0.7 ·w=0.6
´=0.5 Â=0.4
Production ®=0.36 ±=0.025 ¾a=0.13 ¾© = 0:5
¾¶ = 0:01 µ = 11:0 ½z = 0:95 ¾² = 0:007
Price adjustment ! = 0:85
Monetary policy ½R = 0:9 Á¼ = 1:1 ¾¼ = 0:002
Matching and the labor market. Walsh (2005) and den Haan et al. (2000) assume a
total separation rate ½s = 1 ¡ (1 ¡ ½x)(1 ¡ ½n) equal to 0.1 and an exogenous separation
rate ½x = 0:068. In steady state, the endogenous separation rate therefore amounts to
½n = 0:0343. In the matching function, Â is set equal to 0.4 in accordance with empirical
estimates by Blanchard and Diamond (1989). Furthermore, the steady state values of the
matching probabilities are chosen as ·f = 0:7 and ·w=0.6. The workers and the ¯rms split
the surplus evenly implying ´ = 0:5.
12Production and capital adjustment. In addition to Walsh (2005), we introduce cap-
ital into production. The capital elasticity of output is set equal to ® = 0:36. Capital
depreciates at the rate ± = 0:025. Following Christiano et al. (2005), we set ¾¶ = 0:01, but
we will also consider the case of a constant utilization rate with ut ´ 1:0. As empirical
estimates of the adjustment-cost elasticity vary considerably, we consider a wide range of
values for ¾© 2 f1=15;1=2g. In our benchmark case, we choose ¾ = 1=2. In our sensitivity
analysis, we apply ¾© = 1=15 in accordance with Baxter and Crucini (1993).
The log of the aggregate technology shock follows an AR(1) process, logZt = ½z logZt¡1+²t,
with autoregressive parameter ½z = 0:95 and standard deviation ¾² = 0:007. In the
wholesale sector, the demand elasticity is equal to µ = 11 implying an average mark-up
equal to 10%.
Price rigidity. We set the probability ! that a ¯rm is not allowed to change its price
optimally in a given period equal to 0.85. Walsh (2005) uses the same value that implies
the average time between price adjustment of 6.5 quarters. Alternatively, we will also
consider a more frequent price adjustment ! = 0:5 in our sensitivity analysis.
Monetary policy The parameters of the monetary policy rules applied by Walsh (2005)
re°ect a high degree of intertia in the interest rate, ½R = 0:9, and a long-run response of
the interest rate to the in°ation rate by 1.10 implying Á¼ = 1:10. Trigari (2004) chooses
Á¼ = 1:5 which we will also use in our computation in order to study the e®ects of the
policy rule. The monetary policy shock displays a standard deviation ¾Á = 0:002.
3.3 Computation
We use a log-linear approximation of the model around the steady state in order to compute
the dynamics. The log-linearized version of the model is provided in the Appendix. For
the numerical solution, we use the techniques proposed by King and Watson (2002). It
relies upon the Schur factorization of the matrix that is describing the autoregressive part
of the dynamic system.5
5See Section 2.3 in Heer and Maussner (2005) for a detailed description.
134 Results
In this section, we present our results on the dynamics of output and in°ation in the labor
market search model with capital. First, we study the e®ects of a shock to the interest
rate; subsequently, we look at the impact of a productivity shock.
4.1 Interest rate shock
Figure 2 plots the impulse responses of the model variables following an unexpected rise of
the interest rate by one standard deviation (equal to 0.2 percentage points). In this bench-
mark case, we replicate the ¯ndings for the model of Walsh (2005) without capital (compare
his Figure 1). In particular, we choose his calibration with f!;½R;hg = f0:85;0:9;0:78g.6
In addition, capacity utilization is ¯xed (ut ´ 1:0) and adjustment costs of capital are in¯-
nite.7 Therefore, the capital stock remains constant. Following an increase of the nominal
interest rate by 0.2 percentage points, output falls by 0.2% and displays a hump-shaped
response, while in°ation inertia is pronounced and in°ation attains its minimum value at
0.12 percentage points below its steady state value after six quarters.
In the presence of sticky prices, a rise in the nominal interest rate R on bonds results
in a rise of the real interest rate on bonds, R=¼. As a consequence, output demand
declines. Since intermediate sector prices are °exible while wholesale prices are sticky
the relative price of the intermediate sector output gt deteriorates (see the line labeled
P W=P in Figure 2). Therefore, the demand for capital services declines (see equation
(10)), and subsequently the real interest rate falls. Since households are characterized by
habit persistence, consumption adjusts only gradually. Furthermore, as demand declines,
the surplus of an employment relationship for given individual productivity a declines
and ¯rms post less vacancies. For this reason, job matches m(Ut;Vt) and employment
Nt decline. Also, the job ¯nding probability ·w of the workers decreases, while the job
destruction margin a increases (see upper right picture in Figure 2). In addition, the
central bank policy displays a high degree of inertia as nominal interest rates are highly
6Our impulse response functions are smaller by the factor 5 as we consider a shock of one standard
deviation rather than one percentage point.
7In our computation, we use ¾© = 10;000 and ¾¶ = 10000;00 so that both ¹ Kt and ut do not change.
14Figure 2: E®ects of a negative interest rate shock, preset prices, constant capital
auto-correlated (½R = 0:9). As a consequence, the response of output is hump-shaped.8
In the following, we depart from this benchmark case and study the sensitivity of these
results with regard to the introduction of capital. In addition, we will consider the role of
sticky prices, preset prices, and the inertia of the central bank policy.
Variable investment and capacity utilization. In Figure 3, we graph the e®ects of
variable capital on the dynamics of output. Notice that if we introduce very elastic capital
adjustment costs, ¾© = 0:067, investment demand falls signi¯cantly in response to a rise
8If we set ½R equal to zero, the maximum absolute response of output already takes place in the ¯rst
period of the shock.
15Figure 3: E®ects of a negative interest rate shock on output I
in interest rate of only 0.2 percentage points. In this case, we observe an output response
that is much larger than observed empirically. Therefore, a value of ¾© = 0:5 that is in
the upper range of the empirical estimates for the capital adjustment elasticity is in better
accordance with recent VAR estimates on the US output response to a rise in the Federal
Funds Rate. If capacity utilization is also variable, capital services are reduced rather by a
fall in utilization rate ut than by a decrease of the capital stock Kt. The e®ect on output,
however, is negligible. Notice, however, that the response of output is not hump-shaped.
The maximum impact of the interest rate shock on output occurs in the ¯rst period.
Figure 4 plots the dynamics of in°ation in response to a rise of the nominal interest rate
by one standard deviation. Obviously, in°ation displays too little inertia in the case of
variable capital, but constant capacity utilization (blue and green lines). In this case, the
interest rate costs decrease too much and, therefore, marginal costs fall. As a consequence,
the drop in in°ation is pronounced and almost immediate.9 In the case of variable capacity
9If prices were not preset, the biggest impact would be in the very ¯rst period following the shock.
16Figure 4: E®ects of a negative interest rate shock on in°ation I
utilization, however, investment demand changes little and all the adjustment takes place
by using the existing capital stock less intensively. As a consequence, the change in marginal
costs is much smaller and smoother. The dynamics mainly re°ect the sluggish response of
consumption that is driven by the households' preferences with regard to habit formation.
Therefore, only variable capacity utilization is in accordance with the observed in°ation
inertia.
Price stickiness and preset prices. In accordance with Walsh (2005), a higher degree
of price stickiness generates a more persistent in°ation response. In Figure 4, the pink line
plots the in°ation response if ¯rms can set their prices optimally every second quarter on
average corresponding to ! = 0:5. In this case, the in°ation response is more immediate,
while output returns more rapidly to its steady-state value (see also the pink line in Figure
3). Notice that we assume variable capital utilization and a capital adjustment cost elas-
ticity ¾© = 0:5 in this and the following cases when we consider the e®ects of an interest
17Figure 5: E®ects of a negative interest rate shock on output II
rate shock. In particular, we study the sensitivity of our results as we change only one
of the parameters from our benchmark calibration as presented in Table 1. Furthermore,
prices are set prior to the observation of the interest rate shock. This assumption, however,
is rather innocent. If we assume that prices can also be set after the observation of the
shock so that the New-Keynesian Phillips curve is presented by (8) rather than (7), there
is not any noteworthy e®ect on the dynamics of output, whereas the e®ect on in°ation
is more immediate and more pronounced in the ¯rst six quarters after the impact of the
shock (occurring in period two). In order to notice this compare the pink line (prices are
not preset) with the black line (prices are preset) in Figures 5 and 6, respectively.
Monetary policy. As his main result, Walsh (2005) shows that policy inertia is the most
important factor in accounting for the hump-shaped response of output and the persistent
response of in°ation. As we already showed above, in the presence of capital, output does
not display a hump-shaped response any more. However, we are able to con¯rm his second
18Figure 6: E®ects of a negative interest rate shock on in°ation II
result for the economy with capital as soon as we assume capacity utilization to be variable.
In Figures 6, we show that the persistent response of in°ation depends crucially on the
inertia of the policy rule. If the autoregressive parameter of the Taylor rule with respect
to the interest rate is reduced from ½R = 0:9 to ½R = 0, the impulse response of in°ation is
°at (compare the blue line with the black line in Figure 6). The response of in°ation is less
sensitive to the other parameters of the model like, for example, the in°ation parameter
Á¼ of the policy rule. In Figure 6, the green line represents the case when we increase Á¼
from 1.2 to 1.5. If the interest rate R is more sensitive with regard to the in°ation rate,
the response of in°ation is smaller, but still persistent.10
10The persistence of the in°ation response does also not depend on the degree of habit persistence h. In
Figure 6, we present the case h = 0:5. Even without habit persistence, h = 0, (not illustrated), in°ation
is still persistent, while the output response is increased.
194.2 Technology shock
In the previous Section, we found that the model with variable capacity utilization helps to
explain the persistent response of in°ation, even though it cannot account for the hump-
shaped response of output. In this section, we analyze if this model is also able to explain
the output-in°ation dynamics in response to a productivity shock. Figure 7 shows the
impulse response of key variables to a one-time productivity shock in period t = 2 of size
¾Z = 0:007 with ¯xed capital services (i.e. ¾© = 10;000 and ¾¶ = 10;000). All other
parameters are calibrated as in Table 1, and prices are preset.
Figure 7: E®ects of a technology shock
The response of output and employment is consistent with the evidence provided by Gal¶ ³
(1999) and Francis and Ramey (2002) who show that a supply shock raises output but
20depresses employment in the ¯rst few quarters.11 To understand the mechanism behind
this result in our model consider again the relative price of intermediate goods gt (the
line P W=P in the lower right panel of Figure 7). On impact, the increased productivity
entails a lower nominal price of intermediate goods. Since wholesale prices are ¯xed in
the impact period, the relative price of intermediate products falls and counteracts the
outward shift of the production function. Thus, the job destruction margin increases
and more employment relationships separate endogenously. As soon as prices adjust (see
the spikes in the separation rate ½n
t , the relative price of intermediate products, P W=P,
and the real interest rate in Figure 7) the positive e®ect of the technology shock begins to
predominate. Note also that their is a protracted hump-shaped decline of the in°ation rate,
which is in accordance with the persistent negative impact on in°ation found empirically
by Gal¶ ³ (1999).
As in the case of an interest rate shock the dynamics of output and employment is sensitive
with regard to the assumption of ¯xed capital services. Figures 8 and 9 display the impulse
responses of output and employment for di®erent values of key parameters.
If the the utilization of capital services is endogenously determined (¾¶ = 0:01) the e®ect
of predetermined prices on employment is so large that it outweighs the outward shift of
the production function and output declines in the ¯rst quarter. This e®ect is somewhat
smaller if the degree of nominal rigidity as measured by the parameter ! is considerably
decreased (compare the red and the blue line in Figure 8) and even disappears if prices are
moderately rigid and are allowed to change in the same quarter where the shock hits the
economy (see the pink line in Figure 8).
Figure 9 corroborates the ¯nding that the negative e®ects on output originate in the
°exible use of capital services. With ¯xed capital, employment alone bears the burden of
adjustment. The more °exible capital services are, the smaller is the fall of employment
(compare the black, blue, and green lines in Figure 9). However, it requires a substantial
amount of price °exibility for employment to increase immediately after a technology shock
(see the pink line in Figure 9). Using the parameter values from Table 1 together with
! = 0:5 { so that ¯rms can adjust their prices on average every second quarter { we also
11The empirical evidence on the e®ects of technology shocks on employment depend crucially on the
question whether or not hours per worker are stationary. In the latter case Christiano et al. (2003, 2004)
demonstrate that hours increase after a technology shock.
21Figure 8: E®ects of a technology shock on output
need to assume that the ¯rms which are receiving the signal to change their price can do
so immediately after the realization of the technology shock.
In summary, a sharp decrease of output in response to a technology shock is at odds with
the empirical ¯ndings provided by Gal¶ ³ (1999) and Francis and Ramey (2002). In the
present model this puzzle can only be resolved if either the marginal cost function ¶0(ut) is
very elastic or the degree of price rigidity is only modest.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the in°ation and output dynamics in the labor market
search model with capital. In the presence of capital adjustment costs, variable capacity
utilization helps to reconcile the model's in°ation response to a rise in the nominal interest
rate with the one that is observed empirically. However, in this case, the magnitude of
22Figure 9: E®ects of a technology shock on employment
the output response is much stronger than observed in the US economy and, in particular,
the output response is no longer hump-shaped. Therefore, we conclude that the output-
in°ation dynamics of the labor market search model in response to an interest-rate shock
is sensitive with regard to the introduction of capital. This conclusion also applies to the
case when we consider the consequences of a technology shock. Contrary to empirical
¯ndings, an unexpected productivity increase causes a decline in output if capital services
are su±ciently °exible and prices are rigid.
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256 Appendix: The log-linear model
The equilibrium conditions of the model are presented by the 11 contemporaneous equa-
tions (14), (12), (31), (32), (24). (18), (19), (15), (33), (28e), and (28b) which we restate



























































0(ut) = rt: (A.1k)
and the 7 dynamic equations (28a), (28c), (28f), (27), (16), (23), and (29)
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The log-linearized system of equations (A.1) is:
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In (A.3i), we used the steady-state conditions ¶0(¹ u) = r and ¹ K=I = 1=±.
Log-linearizing equations (A.2) yields
¯h¡3Et ^ Ct+1 ¡ (1 + ¯h
2)¡3 ^ Ct (A.4a)
+ h¡3 ^ Ctt¡1 ¡ ^ ¸t = 0;
Et^ ¸t+1 ¡ ^ ¸t = ¡¯rEt^ rt+1 ¡ ¯Et^ »t+1 + ^ »t (A.4b)
^ ¹ Kt+1 + (± ¡ 1) ^ ¹ Kt = ±^ It; (A.4c)
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27Et^ ¸t+1 + ^ Rt+1 ¡ Et^ ¼t+1 ¡ ^ ¸t = 0; (A.4f)
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;
where we have also used the New Keynesian Phillips curve (7) in (A.4h) with the time
index shifted one period forward.
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